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The Translator's Task 
Walter Benjamin 
Translated by Steven Rendall 
When seeking knowledge of a work of art or an art form, 
it never proves useful to take the receiver into account. Not only is 
every effort to relate art to a specific public or its representatives 
misleading, but the very concept of an "ideal" receiver is spurious 
in any discussion concerning the theory of art, since such 
discussions are required to presuppose only the existence and 
essence of human beings. Art itself also presupposes man's 
corporal and spiritual essence — but no work of art presupposes his 
attention. No poem is meant for the reader, no picture for the 
beholder, no symphony for the audience. 
Is a translation meant for readers who do not understand 
the original? That would seem sufficient to explain the differing 
status of original and translation in the domain of art. In any event, 
it appears to be the only possible reason for saying "the same 
thing" over again. What does a poem "say," then? What does it 
communicate? Very little, to a person who understands it. Neither 
message nor statement is essential to it. However, a translation that 
seeks to transmit something can transmit nothing other than a 
message —- that is, something inessential. And this is also the 
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hallmark of bad translations. But what then is there in a poem — 
and even bad translators concede this to be essential — besides a 
message? Isn't it generally acknowledged to be the 
incomprehensible, the secret, the "poetic"? That which the 
translator can render only insofar as he — also writes poetry? This 
in fact leads to another distinguishing mark of bad translation, 
which can be defined as inexact transmission of an inessential 
content. And we never get beyond this, so long as translation 
claims to serve the reader. If it were intended for the reader, then 
the original would also have to be intended for the reader. If the 
original is not created for the reader's sake, then how can this 
relationship allow us to understand translation? 
Translation is a mode. In order to grasp it as such, we have 
to go back to the original. For in it lies translation's law, decreed 
as the original's translatability. The question of a work's 
translatability has two senses. It can mean: will it ever find, among 
the totality of its readers, an adequate translator? Or, more 
pertinently, whether by its very essence it allows itself to be 
translated, and hence — in accord with the meaning of this mode 
— also calls for translation. In principle, the first question can be 
answered only in a problematic manner, the second apodictically. 
Only superficial thinking will, by denying the independent sense 
of the second question, declare them to have the same meaning. In 
opposition to this it must be pointed out that certain relational 
concepts gain their proper, indeed their best sense, when they are 
not from the outset connected exclusively with human beings. 
Thus we could still speak of an unforgettable life or moment, even 
if all human beings had forgotten it. If the essence of such lives or 
moments required that they not be forgotten, this predicate would 
not be false, it would merely be a demand to which human beings 
had failed to respond, and at the same time, no doubt, a reference 
to a place where this demand would find a response, that is, a 
reference to a thought in the mind of God. The translatability of 
linguistic constructions would accordingly have to be taken into 
consideration even if they were untranslatable by human beings. 
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And mustn't they actually be untranslatable to a certain degree, if 
a rigorous concept of translation is applied? In that case we must 
ask whether the translation of certain linguistic constructions is 
required. For this proposition is relevant here : if translation is a 
mode, then translatability must be essential to certain works. 
Translation is properly essential to certain works : this 
does not mean that their translation is essential for themselves, but 
rather that a specific significance inherent in the original texts 
expresses itself in their translatability. It is clear that a translation, 
no matter how good, cannot have any significance for the original. 
Nevertheless, it stands in the closest connection with the original 
by virtue of the latter's translatability. Indeed, this connection is all 
the more intimate because it no longer has any significance for the 
original itself. It can be called a natural connection, and more 
precisely a vital connection. Just as expressions of life are 
connected in the most intimate manner with the living being 
without having any significance for the latter, a translation 
proceeds from the original. Not indeed so much from its life as 
from its "afterlife" or "survival" [Überleben]. Nonetheless the 
translation is later than the original, and in the case of the most 
significant works, which never find their chosen translators in the 
era in which they are produced, indicates that they have reached 
the stage of their continuing life [Fortleben]. The notion of the life 
and continuing life of works of art should be considered with 
completely unmetaphorical objectivity. Even in ages of the most 
prejudiced thinking it has been suspected that life must not be 
attributed to organic corporeality alone. But there can be no 
question of extending its dominion under the feeble aegis of the 
soul, as Fechner attempted to do; not to mention defining life on 
the basis of still less decisive aspects of animal life such as 
sensitivity, which betokens life only occasionally. Rather, it is only 
when life is attributed to everything that has a history, and not to 
that which is only a stage setting for history, that this concept 
comes into its own. For the range of the living must ultimately be 
delimited on the basis of history and not of nature, without 
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mentioning such unstable notions as sensitivity and soul. From this 
arises the philosopher's task, which is to understand all natural life 
on the basis of the more comprehensive life of history. And isn't 
the continuing life of works incomparably easier to recognize than 
that of creatures? The history of great works of art knows about 
their descent from their sources, their shaping in the age of the 
artists, and the periods of their basically eternal continuing life in 
later generations. Where it appears, the latter is called fame. 
Translations that are more than transmissions of a message are 
produced when a work, in its continuing life, has reached the age 
of its fame. Hence they do not so much serve the work's fame (as 
bad translators customarily claim) as owe their existence to it. In 
them the original's life achieves its constantly renewed, latest and 
most comprehensive unfolding. 
As the unfolding of a special, high form of life, this 
unfolding is determined by a special, high purposefulness. Life and 
purposefulness — the connection between them seems easily 
accessible but nevertheless almost escapes knowledge, disclosing 
itself only where that purpose, toward which all the particular 
purposes of life tend, ceases to be sought in its own sphere, and is 
sought instead in a higher one. All purposeful phenomena of life, 
as well as life's purposefulness itself, are in the final analysis 
purposeful not for life, but for the expression of its essence, for the 
representation of its significance. Thus translation ultimately has 
as its purpose the expression of the most intimate relationships 
among languages. Translation cannot possibly reveal or produce 
this hidden relationship; however, translation can represent this 
relationship, insofar as it realizes it seminally or intensively. In 
fact, this representation of the intended object by means of an 
incomplete form or seed of its production is a very special mode 
of representation seldom to be encountered in the domain of non-
linguistic life. For in analogies and signs non-linguistic life has 
types of reference other than intensive, that is, anticipatory, 
intimating realization. — This imagined, inner relationship among 
languages is, however, a relationship of special convergence. It 
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consists in the fact that languages are not alien to each other, but 
a priori, and independently of all historical connections, related to 
each other in what they want to say. 
With this attempt at an explanation the discussion seems 
clearly to have come out, after futile detours, at the traditional 
theory of translation. If the relationship among languages is to 
demonstrate itself in translations, how could it do so except by 
conveying the form and sense of the original as accurately as 
possible? Of course, the traditional theory would scarcely be able 
to define this concept of accuracy, and thus could give no account 
of what is essential to translation. In truth, however, the 
relationship among languages shows itself in translations to be far 
deeper and more definite than in the superficial and indefinable 
similarity of two literary texts. To grasp the true relationship 
between original and translation, we must undertake a line of 
thought completely analogous, in its goal, to those taken by critical 
epistemology in demonstrating the impossibility of a reflection 
theory. Just as in critical epistemology it is shown that there can be 
no objective knowledge, or even the claim to such knowledge, if 
the latter consists in reflections of the real, so here it can be shown 
that no translation would be possible if, in accord with its ultimate 
essence, it were to strive for similarity to the original. For in its 
continuing life, which could not be so called if it were not the 
transformation and renewal of a living thing, the original is 
changed. Established words also have their after-ripening. What 
might have been the tendency of an author's poetic language in his 
own time may later be exhausted, and immanent tendencies can 
arise anew out of the formed work. What once sounded fresh may 
come to sound stale, and what once sounded idiomatic may later 
sound archaic. To seek what is essential in such transformations, 
as well as in the equally constant transformations of sense, in the 
subjectivity of later generations rather than in the inner life of 
language and its works, would be — even granting the crudest 
psychologism — to confuse the ground and the essence of a thing; 
or, putting it more strongly, it would be to deny, out of an 
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impotence of thought, one of the most powerful and fruitful 
historical processes. Even if one were to consider the last stroke of 
the author's pen the work's coup de grâce, that would not suffice 
to save this dead theory of translation. For just as the tone and 
significance of great literary works are completely transformed 
over the centuries, the translator's native language is also 
transformed. Indeed, whereas the poetic word endures in its own 
language, even the greatest translation is destined to be taken up 
into the growth of its language and perish as a result of its renewal. 
Far from being a sterile similarity between two languages that have 
died out, translation is, of all modes, precisely the one called upon 
to mark the after-ripening of the alien word, and the birth pangs of 
its own. 
If the kinship of languages manifests itself in translation, 
it does so otherwise than through the vague similarity of original 
and copy. For it is clear that kinship does not necessarily involve 
similarity. In this context the notion of kinship is in accord with its 
narrower usage, to the extent that in both cases it cannot be 
adequately defined by similarity of origin, although the concept of 
origin remains indispensable in defining the narrower usage. — 
Wherein can the kinship of two languages be sought, apart from a 
historical kinship? No more in the similarity of literary texts than 
in the similarity of their words. All suprahistorical kinship of 
languages consists rather in the fact that in each of them as a 
whole, one and the same thing is intended; this cannot be attained 
by any one of them alone, however, but only by the totality of their 
mutually complementary intentions : pure language. Whereas all 
the particular elements of different languages — words, sentences, 
structures — are mutually exclusive, these languages complement 
each other in their intentions. To gain a precise understanding of 
this law, one of the most fundamental laws of the philosophy of 
language, it is necessary to distinguish, within intention, the 
intended object from the mode of its intention. In "Brof and 
"pain" the intended object is the same, but the mode of intention 
differs. It is because of their modes of intention that the two words 
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signify something different to a German or a Frenchman, that they 
are not regarded as interchangeable, and in fact ultimately seek to 
exclude one another; however, with respect to their intended 
object, taken absolutely, they signify one and the same thing. Thus 
whereas these two words' modes of intention are in conflict, they 
complement each other in the two languages from which they 
stem. And indeed in them the relation between the mode of 
intention and the intended object is complemented. In the 
individual, uncomplemented languages, the intended object is 
never encountered in relative independence, for instance in 
individual words or sentences, but is rather caught up in constant 
transformation, until it is able to emerge as pure language from the 
harmony of all these modes of intention. Until then it remains 
hidden in the various languages. But if languages grow in this way 
until they reach the messianic end of their history, then it is 
translation that is ignited by the eternal continuing life of the work 
and the endless revival of languages in order to constantly test this 
sacred growth of languages, to determine how distant what is 
hidden within them is from revelation, how close it might become 
with knowledge of this distance. 
To say this is of course to admit that translation is merely 
a preliminary way of coming to terms with the foreignness of 
languages to each other. A dissolution of this foreignness that 
would not be temporal and preliminary, but rather instantaneous 
and final, remains out of human reach, or is at least not to be 
sought directly. Indirectly, however, the growth of religions ripens 
into a higher language the seed hidden in languages. Thus 
translation, although it cannot claim that its products will endure, 
and in this respect differs from art, does not renounce its striving 
toward a final, ultimate, and decisive stage of all linguistic 
development. In translation the original grows into a linguistic 
sphere that is both higher and purer. It cannot, however, go on 
living indefinitely in this sphere, since it is far from attaining it in 
all parts of its form; but it nevertheless at least points, with 
wonderful penetration, toward the predetermined, inaccessible 
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domain where languages are reconciled and fulfilled. The original 
does not attain this domain in every respect, but in it lies that 
which, in a translation, is more than a message. This essential 
kernel can be more precisely defined as what is not retranslatable 
in a translation. One can extract from a translation as much 
communicable content as one wishes, and this much can be 
translated; but the element toward which the genuine translator's 
efforts are directed remains out of reach. It is not translatable, like 
the literary language of the original, because the relation between 
content and language in the original is entirely different from that 
in the translation. In the original, content and language constitute 
a certain unity, like that between a fruit and its skin, whereas a 
translation surrounds its content as if with the broad folds of a 
royal mantle. For translation indicates a higher language than its 
own, and thereby remains inappropriate, violent, and alien with 
respect to its content. This fracture hinders any further translation, 
and at the same time renders it superfluous. For every translation 
of a work at a specific point in the history of language represents, 
with respect to a specific aspect of its content, translation into all 
other languages. Thus translation transplants the original into an — 
ironically — more ultimate linguistic domain, since it cannot be 
displaced from it by any further translation, but only raised into it 
anew and in other parts. It is not for nothing that the word 
"ironically" reminds us here of Romantic modes of thought. The 
Romantics, more than any others, gained insight into the life of 
works of art, to which translation bears the highest witness. The 
Romantics, of course, hardly recognized the significance of 
translation, turning their attention instead entirely toward criticism, 
which also represents a genuine, though narrower, element in the 
work's continuing life. But even if their theory was not much 
inclined to focus on translation, their great translation work itself 
was accompanied by a sense of the essence and dignity of this 
mode. This feeling — everything points to this — need not be at its 
strongest in the poet; it may in fact play the smallest role in him 
qua poet. History certainly does not suggest that major translators 
are poets and minor poets are mediocre translators, as is generally 
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believed. Many of the greatest, such as Luther, Voss, and Schlegel, 
are incomparably more important as translators than as poets, and 
others, such as Hölderlin and George, cannot be adequately 
described solely as poets when the whole range of their work — 
and especially their translations — is taken into account. Just as 
translation is a distinctive mode, the translator's task may also be 
conceived as distinctive and clearly differentiated from the poet's. 
The translator's task consists in this : to find the intention 
toward the language into which the work is to be translated, on the 
basis of which an echo of the original can be awakened in it. Here 
we encounter a characteristic of translation that decisively 
distinguishes it from the poetic work, because the latter's intention 
never is directed toward language as such, in its totality, but solely 
and immediately toward certain linguistic structurings of content. 
However, unlike a literary work, a translation does not find itself, 
so to speak, in middle of the high forest of the language itself; 
instead, from outside it, facing it, and without entering it, the 
translation calls to the original within, at that one point where the 
echo in its own language can produce a reverberation of the 
foreign language's work. Its intention is not only directed toward 
an object entirely different from that of the poetic work, namely 
toward a language as a whole, starting out from a single work of 
art, but is also different in itself : the poet's intention is 
spontaneous, primary, concrete, whereas the translator's is 
derivative, final, ideal. For the great motive of integrating the 
plurality of languages into a single true language is here carrying 
out its work. In this integration individual propositions, poetic 
structures, and judgments never arrive at agreement (since they 
remain dependent on translation); it is rather the languages 
themselves that agree, complemented and reconciled with each 
other in their mode of intention. If there is nevertheless a language 
of truth, in which the ultimate secrets toward which all thinking 
strives are stored up, at peace and even silent, then this language 
of truth is — "the true language." And in fact this language, in the 
anticipation and description of which lies the only perfection 
159 
philosophy can hope to achieve, is concealed intensively in 
translations. There is no muse of philosophy, and there is also no 
muse of translation. They are not, however, philistine, as 
sentimental artistic folk would like to think. For there is a 
philosophical genius, whose essential characteristic is the longing 
for the language that is announced in translation. "Les langues 
imparfaites en cela que plusieurs, manque la suprême: penser étant 
écrire sans accessoires, ni chuchotement mais tacite encore 
l'immortelle parole, la diversité, sur terre, des idiomes empêche 
personne de proférer les mots qui, sinon se trouveraient, par une 
frappe unique, elle-même matériellement la vérité." If what 
Mallarmé conceives in these words is rigorously applied to the 
philosopher, then translation, with its seeds of such a language, 
stands half-way between poetry and doctrine. Translation's work 
is less prominent than doctrine's, but it puts its mark on history no 
less deeply. 
If the translator's task is regarded in this light, then the 
paths to its fulfillment threaten to become all the more 
impenetrably dark. Indeed, this task — that of bringing the seeds of 
pure speech to ripeness in translation — seems impossible to 
accomplish, determinable in no realization. And isn't the ground 
cut out from under any such realization if the reproduction of 
meaning is no longer the criterion? Viewed negatively, that is 
precisely the import of all the foregoing. Fidelity and freedom — 
the freedom of rendering in accord with the meaning, and in its 
service, fidelity in opposition to the word — these are the old, 
traditional concepts in every discussion of translation. They no 
longer seem useful for a theory that seeks in translation something 
other than the reproduction of meaning. Indeed, used in the 
conventional way, they are perpetually caught up in an irresolvable 
conflict. What precisely can fidelity actually contribute to the 
reproduction of meaning? Fidelity in translating the individual 
word can almost never fully render the meaning it has in the 
original. For this meaning is fully realized in accord with its poetic 
significance for the original work not in the intended object, but 
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rather precisely in the way the intended object is bound up with the 
mode of intention in a particular word. It is customary to express 
this by saying that words carry emotional connotations. In reality, 
with regard to syntax, word-for-word translation completely rejects 
the reproduction of meaning and threatens to lead directly to 
incomprehensibility. For the nineteenth century, Hölderlin's 
translations of Sophocles represented a monstrous example of this 
kind of literalness. Finally, it is self-evident that fidelity in 
rendering form makes rendering meaning more difficult. Hence 
the demand for literalness cannot be deduced from the interest in 
maintaining meaning. The latter serves the undisciplined license of 
bad translators far more than it serves poetry and language. 
Therefore this demand, whose justice is obvious and whose ground 
is deeply concealed, must necessarily be understood on the basis 
of more pertinent relationships. Just as fragments of a vessel, in 
order to be fitted together, must correspond to each other in the 
tiniest details but need not resemble each other, so translation, 
instead of making itself resemble the meaning of the original, must 
lovingly, and in detail, fashion in its own language a counterpart 
to the original's mode of intention, in order to make both of them 
recognizable as fragments of a vessel, as fragments of a greater 
language. For that very reason translation must in large measure 
turn its attention away from trying to communicate something, 
away from meaning; the original is essential to translation only 
insofar as it has already relieved the translator and his work of the 
burden and organization of what is communicated. En arche hen 
ho logos, in the beginning was the word : this is also valid in the 
realm of translation. On the other hand, the translation's language 
can, indeed must free itself from bondage to meaning, in order to 
allow its own mode of intentio to resound, not as the intentio to 
reproduce, but rather as harmony, as a complement to its language 
in which language communicates itself. Hence reading a 
translation as if it were an original work in the translation's own 
language is not the highest form of praise, especially in the age 
when the translation is produced. On the contrary, the meaning of 
the fidelity ensured by literal translation is that the great longing 
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for the completion of language is expressed by the work. True 
translation is transparent, it does not obscure the original, does not 
stand in its light, but rather allows pure language, as if 
strengthened by its own medium, to shine even more fully on the 
original. This is made possible above all by conveying the syntax 
word-for-word, and this demonstrates that the word, not the 
sentence, is the original element of translation. For the sentence is 
the wall in front of the language of the original, and word-for-word 
rendering is the arcade. 
While fidelity and freedom in translation have long been 
seen as conflicting tendencies, it also seems that this deeper 
interpretation of one of them does not reconcile the two, but on the 
contrary denies the other any justification. For what can the point 
of freedom be, if not the reproduction of meaning, which is no 
longer to be regarded as normative? Only if it can be posited that 
the meaning of a linguistic construction is identical with the 
meaning of its communication, does something ultimate and 
decisive remain beyond any message, very near it and yet infinitely 
distant, hidden under it or clearer, broken by it or more powerful. 
Beyond the communicable, there remains in all language and its 
constructions something incommunicable which is, depending on 
the context in which it is encountered, either symbolizing or 
symbolized; symbolized however in the development of the 
languages themselves. And what seeks to be represented and even 
produced in the development of languages is that kernel of pure 
language itself. But if this hidden and fragmentary kernel is 
nevertheless present in life as something symbolized, it inhabits 
linguistic constructions only as something symbolizing. While this 
ultimate being, which is therefore pure speech itself, is in 
languages bound up only with the linguistic and its 
transformations, in linguistic constructions it is burdened with 
heavy and alien meaning. Translation alone possesses the mighty 
capacity to unbind it from meaning, to turn the symbolizing 
element into the symbolized itself, to recuperate the pure language 
growing in linguistic development. In this pure language — which 
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no longer signifies or expresses anything but rather, as the 
expressionless and creative word that is the intended object of 
every language — all communication, all meaning, and all 
intention arrive at a level where they are destined to be 
extinguished. And it is in fact on the basis of them that freedom in 
translation acquires a new and higher justification. Freedom does 
not gain its standing from the communication's meaning; it is 
precisely truth's task to emancipate freedom from meaning. 
Rather, freedom demonstrates in the translation's own language 
what it can contribute to the service of pure language. To set free 
in his own language the pure language spellbound in the foreign 
language, to liberate the language imprisoned in the work by 
rewriting it, is the translator's task. To this end he breaks through 
the rotten barriers of his own language : Luther, Voss, Hölderlin, 
George have all extended the frontiers of the German language. — 
What now remains for the significance of meaning in the 
relationship between translation and original can be easily summed 
up in a comparison. Just as a tangent touches a circle fleetingly and 
at only a single point, and just as this contact, not the point, 
prescribes the law in accord with which the tangent pursues its 
path into the infinite, in the same way a translation touches the 
original fleetingly and only at the infinitely small point of 
meaning, in order to follow its own path in accord with the law of 
fidelity in the freedom of linguistic development. Without naming 
or grounding it, Rudolf Pannwitz has characterized the true 
significance of this freedom in certain passages of his book Die 
Krisis der europäischen Kultur which, next to Goethe's remarks in 
the notes to his Westöstlicher Divan, must be by far the best thing 
published in Germany on the theory of translation. He writes : "our 
translations even the best start out from a false principle they want 
to germanize Indie Greek English instead of indicizing, graecizing, 
anglicizing German, they are far more awed by their own linguistic 
habits than by the spirit of the foreign work [...] the fundamental 
error of the translator is that he holds fast to the state in which his 
own language happens to be rather than allowing it to be put 
powerfully in movement by the foreign language, he must in 
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particular when he is translating out of a language very distant 
from his own penetrate back to the ultimate elements of the 
language at that very point where image tone meld into one he 
must broaden and deepen his own language through the foreign 
one we have no notion how far this is possible to what degree each 
language can transform itself one language differentiates itself 
from another almost as one dialect from another but this happens 
not when they are considered all too lightly but only when they are 
considered with sufficient gravity." 
To what extent a translation can correspond to the essence 
of this mode is determined objectively by the translatability of the 
original. The less value and dignity its language has, the more it is 
communication of meaning, the less is to be gained from it for 
translation, up to the point where the overpowering weight ofthat 
meaning, far from being a lever for producing a translation fully in 
accord with its mode, makes the latter impossible. The higher the 
work's constitution, the more it remains translatable, in the very 
fleetingness of its contact with its meaning. This is of course true 
only of original works. Translations, on the contrary, prove to be 
untranslatable not because meaning weighs on them heavily, but 
rather because it attaches to them all too fleetingly. For this as for 
every other essential aspect, Hölderlin's translations represent a 
confirmation, particularly his translations of the two Sophoclean 
tragedies. In them the harmony of languages is so deep that 
meaning is touched by language only in the way an Aeolian harp 
is touched by the wind. Hölderlin's translations are prototypes of 
their mode; they are related to even the most fully realized 
translations of their texts as a prototype is related to a model, as a 
comparison of Hölderlin's and Borchardt's translations of Pindar's 
third Pythian ode shows. For that very reason they, more than all 
others, are inhabited by the monstrous and original danger of all 
translation : that the portals of a language broadened and made 
malleable in this way may close and lock up the translator in 
silence. The Sophocles translations were Hölderlin's last work. In 
them meaning plunges from abyss to abyss until it threatens to 
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become lost in the bottomless depths of language. But there is a 
stopping point. It is, however, accorded only to holy scripture, in 
which meaning has ceased to be the watershed dividing the flow 
of language from the flow of revelation. Where the text belongs 
immediately to truth or doctrine, without the mediation of 
meaning, in its literalness of true language, it is unconditionally 
translatable. No longer for its own sake, but solely for that of the 
languages. With regard to this text such boundless trust is required 
of translation, that just as language and revelation must be united 
in the text, literalness and freedom must be united in the form of 
an interlinear translation. For to some degree all great writings, but 
above all holy scripture, contain their virtual translation between 
the lines. The interlinear version of the holy scriptures is the 
prototype or ideal of all translation. 
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